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the judge rather than the prosecutor. Of course, separate trials
may not be ordered when the evidence will be repetitious, the
multiplicity of trials vexatious, or when the multiplicity will
enable the prosecution to use the experience of the first trial to
strengthen its case in a subsequent trial.50
The actual holding in Waller is both logical and clearly
stated. However, the same transaction concept of double jeop-
ardy may well have opened a veritable Pandora's Box of legal
problems and collateral issues that could have both immediate
and profound effects on the administration of criminal justice
in Louisiana. The best solution to the problems posed by this
concept seems to be the proposal by the American Law Institute
in their Model Penal Code which requires the joinder of all
known offenses in a single trial.51
W. John English, Jr.
DECLARATORY RELIEF IN LOUISIANA: THE POTENTIAL
FOR PROCEDURAL MISUSE
Developers purchased an option on a large tract of land to
be exercised by the payment of almost a million dollars and the
execution of a note and mortgage for the balance of the sale
price.' At the instance of developers the land was rezoned to
permit construction of apartments, a shopping center, and other
non-residential uses. Area residents filed suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the ordinances under which the tract was
rezoned 2 were unconstitutional. Developers responded by filing
50. Id.
51. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (1962):
"(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except as
provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appro-
priate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial
and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.
"(3) Authority of court to Order Separate Trials. When a defendant is
charged with two or more offenses based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, the Court, on application of the prosecuting
attorney or of the defendant, may order any such charge to be tried sepa-
rately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires."
1. Cost of the option itself was $40,000. Developers shortly thereafter
expended more than $200,000 in engineering and consulting fees. The option
was to be exercised by the payment of $910,000 and the execution of a mort-
gage for $3,850,000. Total outlay for the completed development was esti-
mated to be approximately $100,000,000.
2. Baton Rouge, La., Ordinance 2317, June 11, 1969; Parish of East Baton
Rouge, La., Ordinance 3095, June 11, 1969.
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a "Motion to Dismiss for Improper Use of Declaratory Action,"
alleging the suit put a cloud on their title and prevented them
from obtaining further financing. They maintained that plain-
tiffs should have sought injunctive relief which would have al-
lowed speedy disposition of the suit, thereby preventing a large
financial loss to the developers.8 This procedure, however, would
have necessitated posting of security by plaintiffs4 and exposed
them to liability for damages for the wrongful issuance of an
injunction.5 The trial court upheld developers' exception but
the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and held, despite
developers' showing of injury, plaintiffs were entitled to declara-
tory relief and could not be compelled to seek relief through
speedier procedural methods. Villa del Rey Citizens Association
v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So.2d 566 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970) .7
Since a companion suit in which injunctive relief was sought
resulted in a declaration that the ordinances were constitutional,
the court was spared from rendering a decision actually allow-
ing the harmful effects claimed by developers.8 Yet, it is sub-
mitted that the instant decision indicates a need for reap-
praisal of the available methods of relief which allow plaintiffs
the capability of inflicting substantial injury by invoking the
slowest possible judicial procedure. In effect, Villa del Rey
allows irate plaintiffs the possibility of winning their suit by
capitalizing on inertia and unavoidable delay in the adjudicatory
process rather than by a judicial pronouncement on the merits
of their plea.
In view of this development, a review of the availability
of declaratory relief in Louisiana seems to be in order. It should
be noted initially that the history of the judicial acceptance of
declaratory relief in Louisiana is not unlike other states.9 In
3. The option was to expire in October, 1969, and thus would have lapsed
before the constitutional status of the ordinances could be determined with
any degree of finality.
4. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3610.
5. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 3608.
6. The court reasoned that plaintiffs were "perverting the declaratory
judgment statutes" and ordered the plaintiffs to amend their petition to pro-
vide for summary procedure or suffer a nonsuit. Villa del Rey Citizens Ass'n
v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So.2d 566, 567 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
7. Somewhat the inverse situation was presented in West v. Winnsboro,
252 La. 605, 211 So.2d 665 (1968). Defendant in that case urged that injunc-
tive relief from a Sunday-closing law should not lie because declaratory
relief was available to plaintiff, but the court held otherwise, opining that
declaratory relief was inadequate.
8. Smith v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So.2d 569 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
9. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 317-37 (2d ed. 1941).
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spite of the pleas of commentators 10 and some individual judges, 1'
judicial acceptance of declaratory relief was hesitant and even
grudging. Even after the legislature provided for declaratory
judgments, 12 the supreme court in Burton v. Lester'8 announced
that declaratory relief was unavailable where the plaintiff could
pursue another remedy. This case was severely criticized 4 and
legislatively overruled by the adoption of article 1871's of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Based in part upon Federal Rule 57,16
article 1871 provides in part that "the existence of another ade-
quate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief
in cases where it is appropriate." This phrase serves to limit
severely the ability of the judiciary to deny declaratory relief;
its effect was quickly recognized. 17
Subsequent to the enactment of article 1871, the Louisiana
courts have exhibited great sympathy for requests for declara-
tory judgments.'8 In fact, it is submitted that the court in the
instant case adopted an overly restrictive view of its discretion
to deny declaratory relief. Under the facts presented, it could
have easily declined declaratory relief within the proper bounds
of its discretion.
Before discussing in detail the statutory limits on judicial
discretion, it should be noted that the effect of the instant deci-
sion appears to be contrary to the reasons for which adoption of
10. H. MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE § 2 (1939).
11. Lee, The Declaratory Judgments Act, 20 TUL. L. REV. 566, 567 (1946).
12. La. Acts 1948, No. 431, §§ 1-16; La. Acts 1948, No. 22, §§ 1-16. These
two Acts were codified in LA. R.S. 13:1431-46 (1950) and were repealed by La.
Acts 1960, No. 32, § 2. The subject matter was then transferred to LA. CODO
Civ. P. arts. 1871-79, 1920, 2164, 1880-81, 5251, 1882-83, and the old LA. R.S.
13:4246 (1950) was omitted.
13. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955).
14. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term-
Civil Procedure, 17 LA. L. REv. 379, 382 (1957).
15. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871: "Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is
prayed for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude
a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree."
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 57: "The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropri-
ate ......
17. Orleans Parish School Ed. v. Manson, 241 La. 1029, 1035 n. 1, 132 So.2d
885, 887 n. 1 (1961).
18. See, e.g., West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So.2d 665 (1968), and
cases cited therein. See also Plebst v. Barnwell Drlg. Co., 243 La. 874, 148
So.2d 584 (1963), in which the court approved the use of declaratory judg-
ments in zoning suits.
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the declaratory judgment statutes was urged. Judge Elmo P.
Lee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated in a 1946 address:
"[The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act] disposes of
disputes in their initial states before conflicts become bitter
and business relations are impaired .... The Act affords a
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal dis-
putes."'19 (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, Dean McMahon urged adoption of a declaratory judg-
ment statute because:
"[I]f before injury has been inflicted, the parties could ob-
tain a decision of questions in dispute, much of the unde-
sirable features [sic] of present day litigation might be elim-
inated.""
The court of appeal in the instant case stated that its dis-
cretion to deny declaratory relief was "based primarily on the
authority granted in article 1876 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides that a court may refuse to render a declaratory
judgment if such judgment would not terminate the uncertainty
or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."21 However, article
1871 provides that the "existence of another adequate remedy
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate.'22 (Emphasis added.) Because the legis-
lature has provided by statute that the circumstances described
in article 1876 render declaratory relief inappropriate does not
mean no other situations exist in which the granting of such
relief might be of doubtful propriety.23 Fortunately, the notion
of a more general discretion has survived, as illustrated by
19. Lee, The Declaratory Judgments Act, 20 TUL. L. REv. 566, 567 (1946).
20. H. MCMAHON, LouIsIANA PRACTICE § 2 (1939).
21. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1876: "The court may refuse to render a declara-
tory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered, would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
See Wilshire South Ass'n v. Jefferson Parish Zoning App. Bd., 181 So.2d 866
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) in which the court refused to render declaratory
relief when it found that such a judgment would not end but rather would
foster more litigation. Several of the individual plaintiffs had initiated suits
for damages and the Association had withdrawn its requests for damages
and an injunction. The court also sympathized with the trial court's appre-
hension of mootness since the building had been completed since the filing
of the suit.
22. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871.
23. The court In Villa del Rey said its discretion was based "primarily"
on LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1876.
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Rogers v. Louisiana State Board of Optometry Examiners," in
which the Third Circuit Court of Appeal said:
"In order for an action to be maintained under the act,
however, it must be based on an actual controversy and,
even when such a case is presented, the grant or refusal of
declaratory relief is a matter of judicial discretion."25
Since article 1883 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the articles on declaratory judgments in that Code should
be construed to "harmonize, as far as possible, with federal
laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments
and decrees," 26 it is worthwhile to investigate the experience
of the federal courts with respect to judicial discretion in deny-
ing declaratory judgments. It appears that the federal judiciary
was quick to recognize that declaratory procedures might be
abused. 27 They have denied declaratory relief when inappro-
priately used to gain procedural advantages,28 such as when
suit was brought for a declaration of non-liability in a district
far removed from a potential plaintiff's evidence and witnesses.2 9
Furthermore, it has been explicitly recognized that the bene-
ficial purposes of declaratory judgments may be aborted when
used to secure delay.8 0 Declaratory relief has also been denied
when a response at that time by a defendant was "inconve-
nient."'31 Perhaps most pertinent to the problem discussed herein
is the federal notion that declaratory relief may not be denied
simply because an alternative remedy exists, but dismissal has
24. 126 So.2d 628 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). At the time the suit was Initi-
ated, the Code of Civil Procedure was not in force. Plaintiff argued that the
modified provisions concerning declaratory judgments were persuasive in his
case, and it was in this context that the court discussed them.
25. Id. at 634. In Mitchell v. Louisiana State Board of Optometry Exam-
iners, 182 So.2d 825 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), declaratory relief was granted,
but the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in dictum reaflirmed the principle of
judicial discretion in one of the few Louisiana cases dealing with this prob-
lem.
26. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1883: "Articles 1871 through 1882 shall be inter-
preted and construed so as to effectuate their general purpose to make uni-
form the law of those states which enact them, and to harmonize, as far as
possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory
judgments and decrees."
27. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 312-13 (2d ed. 1941).
28. Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948). See also Shell Oil Co.
v. Frusetta, 290 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1961); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
157 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1946); Note, 51 YALE L. J. 511, 515 (1942).
29. American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 57 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Calif.
1944).
30. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 1939).
31. Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 959 (1969).
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been deemed appropriate when the alternative remedy was pre-
ferable,.82
While it would therefore appear that a court could muster
considerable authority for denying declaratory relief under the
facts presented in Villa del Rey, it would also appear that forc-
ing plaintiffs to proceed by use of injunctive procedures is far
from an ideal solution. As the plaintiffs pointed out, security is
required for injunctive proceedings under article 3610 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. 83 Although the amount of the bond
is within the discretion of the court,8 4 and damages for wrongful
issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-
tion are not mandatory85 and have been denied,86 other cases
exist in which damages have been awarded.3 7 Were security
to be required in all cases it is conceivable that prospective
plaintiffs might be unduly dissuaded from bringing suit even
when their interest in doing so is entirely legitimate.8
The problem presented by the instant case can be reduced
to the following: if landowners are allowed to request declara-
tory relief only, they can preclude developers from obtaining
financing and force loss of the option and connected expenses.
If, on the other hand, landowners are forced to utilize injunctive
relief, security requirements and exposure to liability may pre-
clude their bringing suit to protect their legitimate interests.
32. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Mitchell, 211 F.2d 441, 443 (5th
Cir. 1954), cert. dented, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Harby
Marina, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 663, 664 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Philip
Leasing Co., 214 F. Supp. 273, 275 (W.D. S.D. 1963); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Buce, 197 F. Supp. 136, 139 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thompson,
121 F. Supp. 696, 700 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
33. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3610: "A temporary restraining order or prelimi-
nary injunction shall not Issue unless the applicant furnishes security in the
amount fixed by the court, except where security is dispensed with by law.
The security shall indemnify the person wrongfully restrained or enjoined
for the payment of costs incurred and damages sustained." See Duvigneaud
v. Marcello, 136 So.2d 176 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
34. Glidden v. Loe, 192 So.2d 633, 634 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
35. Amacker v. Amacker, 146 So.2d 672, 677 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Mul-
ler v. Buckley, 143 So.2d 231, 232 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). The latter case
points out that damages were formerly mandatory under LA. CODE OF PRAo-
mcE art. 304 (1870).
36. Mecom v. Mueller, 235 So.2d 597 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Muller v.
Buckley, 143 So.2d 231 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
37. Danzie v. Rutland, 232 So.2d 303 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Shanks v.
Callahan, 232 So.2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
38. Admittedly, security requirements naturally tend to dissuade suits,
regardless of whether they are well-founded and in good faith. The court in
Villa del Rey recognized that "[t]he interest of the plaintiffs in bringing this
action is uncontested. It is only the procedural device they have elected to
use that is objected to." 233 So.2d 566, 567 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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It is submitted that any ultimate solution to this and similar
problems must come from the legislature. Perhaps a rule simi-
lar to Federal Rule 57, which permits expeditious hearings in
suits for declaratory relief upon motion of one party, should be
enacted 5 Commentators have suggested other, more compre-
hensive remedial procedures.40 It is submitted that until such
a fundamental legislative change occurs, the judiciary must
balance the equities in the individual situations with which they
are confronted. In so doing the courts should be cognizant of
the potential for procedural abuse inherent in such situations
and act within permissible limits to preclude improprieties.
Burt K. Carnahan
INSURANCE: THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE AND
SECOND PERMITTEES
Randy Carroll had an automobile which he bought and
maintained with his own funds, but which was registered under
the name of his stepfather and insured under his stepfather's
policy. Randy let a friend borrow the car to go on a double date;
the friend loaned the car to the boy with whom he was double
dating, who wrecked the car through his own negligence. Randy
and the second permittee did not know each other. When the
owner and the collision insurer of the other vehicle involved in
the accident sued the second permittee and his father, they im-
pleaded the liability insurer of the car and their own liability
insurer. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held, since the second
permittee did not have the permission of the named insured,
neither insurance company was liable.' American Home Assur-
ance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 230 So.2d 253 (1969).
Czarniecki presents the problem of the application of the om-
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 57 provides in part: "The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the
calendar. .. ." This would not necessitate the furnishing of security as
required by LA. CODs Civ. P. art. 3610.
40. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVu LAW TREATIS § 2401 (1958), in which
the author advocates a speedy review system for administrative decisions.
1. Neither insurer was found liable for the collision itself; however, State
Farm was held liable for attorney's fees because of its duty to defend. The
Issue of an insurer's duty to defend is not discussed in this casenote. Also,
the court found Randy to be in the position of the named insured although
his stepfather was the policyholder. The court spent little time on this point
and so must have been satisfied that there was no fraud. The issue of who
is the named insured is not discussed in this casenote.
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